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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
 The problem addressed in this thesis will be unique, in that the issue is not to establish the 
most historically accurate definition of God, or of utilitarianism, or to gain clarity regarding an 
age old mystery in the field of philosophy. Rather the problem that this work will address is 
unique, in that it is a problem that no one seems to be concerned with. This is not to say that no 
one has ever addressed the problem, because a few men have, but those men was died over a 
century ago and it seems that their pleas fell on deaf ears. 
 William Paley is the most purposive agent of this argument, he was a clergyman and 
philosopher in the eighteenth century, best known for developing the teleological argument for 
theism. In 1786 his renowned The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy was published. 
This book was so respected that it was a required reading for incoming students at Cambridge 
until the twentieth century. It was in this very book where Paley proposed his theory of 
theological utilitarianism which expressed that God is a utilitarian. 
Paley arrived at this conclusion by understanding that the world humans find themselves 
in seems not only tuned for life, but for the flourishing of life. Furthermore, Paley believed that if 
God truly is omnibenevolent, then He will desire the happiness of His people. Thus, given 
classical theism, God must consequently be utilitarian in His dealings with mankind. So, the 
problem that this thesis confronts is that this area of Paley’s work (namely, theological 
utilitarianism) has been long forgotten in the philosophy of religion. To work against this 
problem, this thesis will attempt to reawaken the argument for God as a utilitarian. 
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 This endeavor is not merely an attempt to resurrect a forgotten argument, but to answer a 
legitimate question about the nature of God which has not been asked for quite some time- and 
when this question has been addressed, it has been met with unsatisfactory answers. Paley’s 
response to the question of “what does God do, and why does He do it?” seems, to this inquirer at 
least, to be the most satisfying answer to date. Paley responds to this query by stating, 
When God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished 
their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both…We conclude, therefore, 
that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclusion being once 
established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, that the method 
of coming to the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire 
into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness.1 
Thus, Paley’s answer to the question at hand is that God does what he does for the happiness of 
His creatures. 
 In short, the problem addressed in this work will be that there is a question in philosophy 
of religion that is not being adequately answered. Given the opportunity to answer this question, 
one may gain valuable insight into the nature of God and how He relates to people and the world 
as a whole. It is difficult to dismiss Paley’s proposed answer to the question. It seems more than 
coincidental that the man which recognized that the world is finely tuned for life also recognized 
the way in which God finely tuned the world for the pleasure of mankind. He not only created 
humans as sentient beings, but made so much of what humans interact with, pleasing to the 
senses. This systematic design seems to reflect the idea that God creates and sustains His 
creation in such a way as to maximize the happiness of sentient beings, such as humans. If this is 
in fact the case (as many theistic philosophers concede), it seems to follow that the God of 
theism is utilitarian when it comes to His interactions with mankind. 
                                                          
1 William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 48. 
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Statement of the Purpose 
 The central aim of this thesis, as stated above, is to answer the question of how one 
should understand God’s relation to mankind and why God does what He does. The official 
stance of the paper is clearly that God is a utilitarian in relation to His dealings with mankind, 
but before this belief can be presented as justified, the paper must remove a bit of the stigma 
often accompanies utilitarian ethics. 
Critics of this ethical system seem to appeal to the naivety of its adherers or to the 
supposedly weak rectitude that happiness/pleasure holds as the foundation for ethics. Much in 
the same way that John Stuart Mill had to refute critics of his day before making a case for the 
legitimacy of utilitarianism, this thesis will be required to disseminate false understandings of 
exactly what it means to speak of God and to speak of utilitarian ethics. Mill says to his 
contemporary critics regarding their misconceptions of utilitarianism, “Those who know 
anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicuris to Bentham, who 
maintained the theory of utility meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from 
pleasure, but pleasure itself.”2 Utilitarianism may not be as poorly understood as it was in Mill’s 
time, but it still carries a strong stigma due to misunderstanding the term. Thus, these will be 
dealt with in the paper. The terms “God” and “utilitarianism” are emphasized above because 
there is apparently some confusion as to the exact meaning of them. This is precisely why they 
will each be given a respectable amount of time within the paper, so that the unfair or inaccurate 
                                                          
2 John Troyer, The Classical Utilitarians: Bentham and Mill (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2003), 99. 
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beliefs towards God and utilitarianism may be thwarted and corrected. This will be a partial 
fulfillment of the purpose of this paper. 
 Other than simply clarifying philosophical misconceptions, this thesis will seek to fulfill 
the purpose of providing clarity as to what sort of being God is. This aspect of the paper will 
specifically address God’s relation with mankind and why God does what He does. This will 
illuminate –potentially- for theologians and philosophers alike what the underlying purpose 
behind God’s actions is and has always been. After all, if the God of theism truly is omnipotent 
and sovereign, one would expect His interaction with the world to be meaningful and to 
ultimately have a greater purpose than simple pragmatism. 
Furthermore, a substantial goal for this thesis will be to express that utilitarianism is not 
merely a matter of good or happiness, but it is a qualitative matter of good and happiness. This is 
to say that goods and pleasures come in degrees and gradations, thus pleasure/happiness in the 
highest goods ought to be what is sought by individuals. So if God is the highest good, as 
Augustine says, then one’s happiness should be found in God, and that is what divine 
utilitarianism believes that God is working toward when He interacts with mankind. Briefly 
stated, the purpose for this thesis is precisely what has been stated here, to provide clarity 
concerning the terms God and utilitarianism, to answer the question of why God does what he 
does, and to identify what the highest good and highest pleasure in the world is. 
Statement of Importance of the Problem 
 The debate concerning the ethical system of God, can be summed up in one central 
question, “Why does God do what He does, particularly in relation with mankind?” A proper 
conception of God and an accurate understanding of ethical systems is necessary for any 
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individual hoping to answer this age old query. The importance of this problem can be summed 
up as follows. 
The field of theology is defined as the study of God. Similarly, a portion of study in the 
field of philosophy of religion is the attempt to understand God’s attributes, God’s nature, and 
how God relates to the world and mankind. If the question noted above were satisfactorily 
answered, then both of these fields would stand to gain in precisely the ways that were just 
described. As it stands however, the leading answer to questions like this one, is divine command 
theory which David Baggett, Jerry Walls, and William Lane Craig are contemporary proponents 
of.3 Hence the importance of this problem; the queen of the sciences and its close relative 
(philosophy) will both be more exhaustive and accurate in their understanding of God once they 
are able to answer not only what God is like or what He does, but why He does what he does in 
relation to mankind. 
Statement of Position on the Problem 
As stated above, the problem addressed in this thesis is not only the resurging a long-
forgotten theory in the philosophy, but it is answering a crucial question for theology and 
philosophy. That question is, “why does God do what He does?” Answering this question springs 
forth many related questions such as, how does God relate to mankind, what is the greatest good, 
how a being like God is ensured of the worship He deserves, and more. The position of this 
paper will be that God does what He does (especially in relation to people) in order to promote 
the maximal happiness of His creatures. 
                                                          
3 Their support of this theory is palpable in works such as David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls. Good God: 
The Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) and William Lane Craig, 
Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1994). 
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To claim that God acts in order to promote the maximal happiness of His creatures 
means, for divine utilitarianism, that God has created the world and finely tuned it not merely to 
make sentient life possible, but to make it a flourishing existence and experience of the world. 
Paley articulates this point more thoroughly when he explains that, 
When God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished 
their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both. If [God] had wished our 
misery, he might have made sure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be so many 
sores and pains to us, as they are now instruments of gratification and enjoyment…If he 
had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must impute to our good fortune 
(as all design by this supposition is excluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive 
pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to produce it. But either of these (and 
still more both of them) being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but 
the first supposition, that God, when he created the human species, wished their 
happiness.4 
Here, Paley explains that if an omnipotent God desired to create mankind in miserable 
circumstances, then he would have ensured it, and that if God was indifferent regarding human 
happiness, then one would not expect such gratuitous good in the world for sentient beings. 
Given these options, Paley’s work, along with this paper conclude that God must have wished 
and willed the happiness of sentient beings when he created the world. Thus, divine 
utilitarianism is the expression of this belief, that God is gracious in His interactions with 
mankind and that His sovereignty is exercised in order to bring about the happiness of His 
creatures. 
Limitations 
 The scope of the interrelated topics connected with utilitarianism and theism is broad and 
cannot adequately be covered in this thesis; nor can the depth of utilitarianism and theism be 
                                                          
4 William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 42-
3. 
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exhausted in one paper, so this will neither be the aim or expectation of this thesis.5 Much of the 
focus will primarily gravitate toward the relationship between the God of classical theism and the 
ethical system of utilitarianism.  
However this thesis will not be able to cover, at least in any depth, issues such as whether 
God is obligated to create the best possible world, the problem of evil, or theological issues of a 
soteriological nature. The latter of these omissions will include the sovereignty of God. This is 
largely a theological issue and is far too deep a subject to be included in what this paper hopes to 
accomplish. 
The omission of these issues is for the sake of the work and the reader alike. The length 
of the paper will not allow for such a thorough treatment of these issues; rather this thesis will act 
more simply as an argument for divine utilitarianism. This is not because these issues are not 
important; rather the reason they cannot be included in this paper is because they are such 
significant theological and philosophical concepts. Although they are important topics, they are 
peripheral to the central aim of this particular work, therefore they will be excluded from this 
thesis. In short, the aim of the paper is not to provide exhaustive information of all of these areas, 
but to provide a case for divine utilitarianism as a plausible theory in the philosophy of religion. 
Development of Thesis 
 The introduction of the thesis will serve as an explanation of what will be explored 
throughout each section of the paper. This will include elucidations in regards to what terms 
                                                          
5 While I understand that Baggett and Walls do this quite well in Good God (particularly in chapter one of 
their work), this work will be a thesis and not a 200 page book, so these exclusions will have to be made, 
unfortunately. 
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must be defined before a thorough discussion of divine utilitarianism can begin; the overall 
argument of the paper will also be briefly expressed here. 
 The terms which necessitate clarification before much progress is made in respect to the 
argument for divine utilitarianism itself, are God and utilitarianism. This may seem pandering, 
but if the definitions or views of these terms are not agreed upon beforehand, then the argument 
for divine utilitarianism might as well be written in an indiscernible foreign language. When the 
task of defining or explaining the nature of God is taken up, the views of Anselm and Thomas 
Aquinas will be appealed to. This will provide a classical theistic foundation for divine 
utilitarianism to work on. Similarly, when utilitarianism is defined, the ideas of Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill will be in focus; this will ensure that classical utilitarianism is in view. 
 The argument for divine utilitarianism will somewhat resemble the arguments of John 
Gay and William Paley, both of which advocated for theological utilitarianism in the eighteenth 
century. The argument presented in this work will essentially follow this outline, P1) 
Relationship with God is the greatest good/happiness a human being can experience. P2) God 
desires as many human beings to have relationship with Him as possible. P3) Utilitarians desire 
the greatest good/happiness for as many human beings as possible. C) Therefore God is a 
utilitarian because He desires the greatest good for as many human beings as possible. Following 
this argument, the summary and conclusion of the thesis will be provided. 
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CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS MEANT BY “DIVINE UTILITARIANISM” 
Introduction 
 From paupers to presidents, one’s beliefs concerning God and ethics have a profound 
effect on one’s life. There are few subjects, if any at all, that contribute to a person’s core beliefs 
and overall character as substantially as these do. In an effort to more thoroughly and accurately 
understand both the nature of God and the approach one ought to take in regards to ethics, the 
(seemingly, largely ignored) subject of the ethics of God must be explored. A properly executed 
and narrow study of this topic will provide philosophers of religion with a greater understanding 
of the nature of God; likewise, it will grant theistic ethicists a stronger framework and foundation 
on which to build an exhaustive theory of ethics. Finally, this study concerning God and ethics 
(more specifically, God’s ethics) will answer a question in philosophy of religion which appears 
to be –at least in recent years— neglected. Although the question in view, why God does what 
He does in relation to man, has been “flirted” with by the Divine Command Theory; it appears 
however, that this theory inadvertently avoids this particular inquiry. 
 In order to contribute to the fields of philosophy of religion and ethics in the way and 
capacity aforementioned, a process consisting of specific steps will be appealed to. First, terms 
that will play a pivotal role in this thesis must be defined. These terms will be God and 
utilitarianism. These ideas need clarification before the argument of divine utilitarianism can be 
developed. It is quite possible that there are many different conceptions regarding what is meant 
by “God” or “utilitarianism”, so this section will narrow and clarify these conceptions by 
focusing in on the classical idea of theism which was held by Anselm and Thomas Aquinas and 
the classical understanding of utilitarianism as was taught by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
12 
 
Mill. Once these terms have been adequately defined for the purpose at hand, the argument for 
divine utilitarianism may be presented. 
 Under the framework of classical theism, God is not only the Creator and Sustainer of all 
things, but is also omnibenevolent, loves His creation, and possesses all other great-making 
attributes as well; and in classical utilitarianism, it is believed that goods and pleasures come in 
degrees. If it is in fact the case that God possesses all great-making attributes and that goods and 
pleasures vary in degrees, then God is the greatest good and pleasure. However, it is not enough 
for God to be the greatest intrinsic good or the greatest utility- that does not make Him utilitarian 
necessarily; in order for God to be utilitarian, He must desire the greatest good/pleasure possible 
for the greatest number of people possible, and that is precisely what the argument for divine 
utilitarianism strives to convey. As the greatest possible being (a being which is omnibenevolent 
and loves His creation), God will desire the greatest pleasure or good possible for the greatest 
amount of people possible. It is the very nature of God to be utilitarian- it follows from His 
goodness. This claim may be contested as over-reaching on the grounds that it is unknown 
whether God desires the greatest good for the greatest number, but this work will contend that 
based upon God’s goodness and personal nature it can be deduced that He does desire such ends. 
Beyond this, an objector to Divine Utilitarianism may claim that God is not the Good, but it is 
evident through the lens of classical theism that God has consistently been identified as such by 
prominent theistic thinkers. 
 Finally, once the necessary terms have been defined and the argument for the theory of 
divine utilitarianism has been made, the need for the theory will be reinforced. Arguably the 
most purposive theory that attempts to explain the ethics of God is the Divine Command Theory. 
The final chapter of this work will contrast these two theories (Divine Utilitarianism and Divine 
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Command Theory) and highlight what the former is able to explain that the latter is incapable of 
explaining. The three main ideas that Divine Utilitarianism is able to explain, which Divine 
Command Theory is deficient in responding to will include, why God does what He does, how 
God’s necessity to be worshipped is ultimately satisfied, and theodicies. In a very straight-
forward way, Divine Utilitarianism provides an adequate explanation for why God does what He 
does (to promote the greatest good for the greatest number), whereas Divine Command Theory 
merely expresses what God does. In terms of explaining God’s necessity to be worshipped, 
Divine Utilitarianism ensures the worship of God by free agents by appealing to God’s 
sovereignty in ensuring this outcome; however Divine Command Theory does not guarantee the 
satisfaction of this divine necessity. Finally, concerning theodicies, Divine Utilitarianism is 
capable of accepting these justifications for the acts of God as the utilitarian constructs that they 
are—wherein God allows the ends to justify the means, but Divine Command Theory does not 
allow for this Machiavellian principle quite as easily. Following the defining of necessary terms, 
the argument for Divine Utilitarianism, and this contrast of divine utilitarianism and Divine 
Command Theory, not only will Divine Utilitarianism be more accessible and understood, but it 
will be seen as a purposive and persuasive theory in regards to the ethics of God. 
A Definition of God 
Defining a term typically includes elucidating the terms’ origin and expounding upon the 
usefulness of the term in question. However, the aim here is not to create a new definition of 
God; rather it is to explore two similar and widely accepted definitions of God that have been 
established and respected for centuries. The definition of God which Anselm proposed in his 
pivotal works Monologion and Proslogion (around 1059-1078 A.D.) has been the standard by 
which most theists have understood the concept of God ever since. Similarly, Thomas Aquinas’ 
14 
 
theological stances have been somewhat of a textbook for Catholics since the fourteenth century.  
This being said, the definition of God that Anselm came to nearly one thousand years ago (and 
that Thomas carried throughout medieval times) is still the definition that most people have in 
view when they use the term “God”.6 Simply stated, Anselm’s beliefs in this regard are not only 
purposive, but are quite attractive as well, as his influence throughout time is evidence of. 
However, in regards to Divine Utilitarianism, this definition of God accomplishes more 
than simply establishing what the nature of God is like; rather this classical view of God also 
enables one to arrive at the Augustinian notion that God is the Good. This is to say that 
adherence to classical theism leads one not only to the belief that God is the greatest possible 
being; the classical theist will consequently believe that God is the Good. By this terminology 
(i.e. the Good) Augustine means to communicate that God is the greatest good in existence and 
that relationship with Him is the greatest good/happiness that a human being can experience. 
This point will be discussed more thoroughly in later chapters, but it is worth noting here that the 
classic theistic definition of God will lay the foundation for seeing God as the Good—and will 
consequently lead to the theory of Divine Utilitarianism. 
Anselm’s God 
Anselm’s God is commonly referred to as the perfect being, the greatest conceivable 
being, and/or the greatest possible being.7 Anselm arrives at this conclusion (partially) by means 
                                                          
6 This may seem like a bit of a generalization, so here is some clarification on this claim. When theists are 
mentioned here, polytheists are not necessarily in view or consideration; rather monotheists are the focus. Whether a 
person is Muslim, Jewish, or Christian, the individual would espouse the idea that their God is in accordance with 
the definition that Anselm sets forth in the aforementioned texts. Given this, it is accurate to state here that a 
majority of theists in general would accept Anselm’s definition, but for clarity’s sake, monotheists are those (the 
majority) which do in fact accept this idea/definition. 
7 Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (ed.), Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 87. 
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of the Platonic idea that there is a form or a definitive standard by which all things are 
measured.8 When one would claim that “x is good” or “x is a sheep”, Plato and Anselm would 
say that one would never claim these things to be the case unless one had a working 
understanding or idea of goodness and sheepness. In the same way, Anselm says, “for example, 
some things that are said, relative to each other, to be, either equally, or more, or less just. They 
cannot be understood to be just except through justice”.9 Due to Anselm’s deeply rooted Platonic 
conviction that all things (objects, attributes, virtues, etc.) have a form which is definitive of what 
is experienced of them in this life, Anselm most likely –and very easily— saw the next logical 
step in this idea as identifying God as the form for all great-making attributes. As a Christian, 
Anselm wondered one day in meditation and prayer why it is that “The fool says in his heart, 
there is no God” (Psalm 14:1). The chief mystery to Anselm was why it is so foolish to believe 
that there is no God, after all, this stance seems to be justifiable prima facie. Through his 
meditation, prayer, and writing Anselm came to the revelation of why it is so foolish for one to 
say to oneself that there is no God—it is impossible even to think this. 
 The impossibility of God’s non-existence is easily conceded once Anselm’s 
understanding of the nature of God is expressed. As was mentioned earlier, Anselm defines God 
as a being, “that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.”10 He expounds upon this phrase 
by clarifying his Platonic view of God in the Monologion, 
there is something supremely good (because all good things are good through some one 
thing, namely that which is good through itself). But in the same way we arrive at the 
necessary conclusion that there is something supremely great, since whatsoever is great is 
great through some one thing, namely that which is great through itself…And since only 
                                                          
8 The idea of the forms is not explicitly stated in Plato’s works, rather it is more of an underlying theme. It 
can be found especially in Phaedo and the Republic. 
9 Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (ed.), Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 12. 
10 Ibid. 87. 
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that which is supremely good can be supremely great, it is necessary that there is 
something that is best and greatest—i.e. of everything that exists, the supreme.11 
This exert from Anselm’s work displays his belief in God as a necessary being. Very similarly to 
C. S. Lewis, Anselm postulates that mankind would have no referent or recognition of goodness, 
greatness, justice, etc. unless there were a standard by which these characteristics were measured 
by—both of these thinkers believe that standard to be God.12 Furthermore, both Anselm and 
Lewis convey that because attributes such as these are in fact recognizable, there must be some 
agent, some being, some thing which not only sets the standard for great-making attributes but is 
the greatest being in all of existence. One recognizes that there are gradations of great-making 
attributes, so there must be in existence one being which is the greatest of all; this being is the 
standard that attributes of this nature are measured, this being (according to Anselm and Lewis) 
is God. 
 Anselm has more to say about the nature of God than that He is the standard of goodness 
and greatness; he also commits to the belief that it is impossible for one to contend that God does 
not exist, and this is precisely what makes the fool’s phrase “there is no God” foolish. If it is the 
case that God necessarily exists, and His nature is such that He is the standard of goodness, then 
God necessarily is (by His nature) the standard of goodness by which all other goods are 
measured. This all begins with Anselm’s belief that God is a necessary being; a being which 
cannot, not exist. In his Proslogion Anselm essentially states that God is the being that-than-
which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought, so God does exist, at the very least, in the mind. 
However, it is greater for a being to exist in reality than merely in the mind. Making this 
distinction, Anselm states that God necessarily exists in reality if He exists in the mind. Further 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 13. 
12 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2001), 38. 
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still, Anselm claims “that God cannot be thought not to exist”.13 This is a two-fold answer for 
Anselm; it explains that if God exists in the mind, God must exist in reality, and that if God is the 
greatest conceivable and greatest possible being, then it is impossible for Him not to exist. 
However, there are arguments against both of these descriptions of God, so they must be taken 
into consideration. 
 As for the necessity of God’s existence in reality following from His existence in the 
mind, there is some debate in the philosophy of language as to whether the term ‘exists’ has 
predication or not.14 That is, it is arguable to claim that stating “God exists” does not convey any 
information about God, therefore it is a useless statement and does not add anything to God’s 
nature or one’s understanding of God’s nature. It has also been argued that “every deduction 
from a definition is only valid hypothetically, on the assumption that the subject of the definition 
is real. A definition, however, cannot be used to establish this assumption.”15 Those who hold to 
this view would express that claiming “that lamp exists”, adds nothing to one’s understanding of 
the lamp since it was clearly in existence and understood to exist previous to the statement being 
made. In response to this criticism, the classical theist would commit that to express the 
existence of something (i.e. “x exists”) does convey information about the subject. 
For instance, upon hearing or reading the popular story of Tom Sawyer, it may come as a 
surprise to hear that amid all of Tom’s attributes, there is also existence. This revelation would 
                                                          
13 Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (ed.), Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 88. 
14 Fred Adams and Gary Fuller, “Empty Names and Pragmatic Implicatures,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 37.3 (2007), http://www.jstor.org/stable/40232330?pq-
origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
Anthony Everett, “Against Fictional Realism,” The Journal of Philosophy 102.12 (2005): 624–649, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3655676?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
15 F. Ueberweg, Grundiss der Geschichte der Philosophie vol. II, rev. by B. Geyer (Berlin, 1928), 199. As 
found in John Hick, and Arthur Chute McGill, The Many-faced Argument: Recent Studies on the Ontological 
Argument for the Existence of God, (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 35. 
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certainly convey something new to a reader. Likewise, if one were told of an animal which has a 
duck bill, webbed feet, is venomous, and has fur; it would be reasonable to assume the animal 
described is fictitious. To the contrary, the platypus is quite real. So, to convey that “x exists” 
does in fact express something new about a subject which was not previously known; and for a 
being to exist is better than for it not to exist; this being understood, it is correct for Anselm to 
claim that ‘existence’ is a necessary attribute for the greatest conceivable being to have. 
Furthermore, the necessary existence of Anselm’s God guarantees the existence of God as the 
standard of goodness. 
 Another objection to Anselm’s claim that it is impossible for God not to exist simply 
claims that it is possible for God not to exist. This objection fundamentally ignores the entire 
nature of God in Anselm’s ontological argument though. After all, Anselm’s argument is called 
the ontological argument; by definition Anselm’s argument rises and falls upon the nature of 
God. As was stated previously, Anselm believed God to be a being “something-than-which-
nothing-greater-can-be-thought”16 This is the point in Anselm’s argument where one must make 
a crucial decision, because this is when a dilemma is presented to the skeptic. On one hand, the 
skeptic (or fool) can grant that Anselm’s God is possible, but “in granting that Anselm’s God as 
a possible thing, we are in fact granting that Anselm’s God actually exists.”17 On the other hand, 
Anselm claims that to imagine God as a non-existing being is either to completely misunderstand 
what is meant by the greatest conceivable being or is intellectually dishonest. He articulates this 
dilemma in the beginning of the Proslogion when he says, 
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Even the fool, then, is forced to agree that something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-
thought exists in the mind, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is 
understood is in the mind. And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought 
cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind it can be thought to exist 
in reality also, which is greater. If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought 
exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is that-
than-which-a-greater-can-be-thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is 
absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both 
in the mind and in reality.18 
As Anselm plainly expresses here, it is easy for one to understand the concept of God in one’s 
mind, but to limit God merely to existence in the mind is by definition a logical impossibility 
since He is the greatest conceivable being. This makes Anselm’s understanding of the nature of 
God clear; “no one, indeed, understanding what God is can think that God does not exist…for 
God is that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.”19 This understanding of God as the 
greatest conceivable being paved the way for the great medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas who 
would come over a century after the death of Anselm and carry a significantly similar view of 
God and God’s nature into modern times. 
Thomas’ God 
Whereas Anselm’s understanding and definition of God can be adequately summarized 
as the greatest conceivable being and he clarifies that this being is the greatest possible being, 
Thomas holds that God is –simply put— the greatest possible being.20 The major difference in 
these two men’s views of God (at least semantically) is that the former contends that God is the 
greatest being that the human mind can think about, and the latter, that God is the absolute 
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greatest being that is capable of existing. Thomas commonly explains his view of God by 
conveying that God has no potentiality whatsoever, rather God is pure actuality.21 
 There are great nuances within and implications from this view of God, but the crucial 
concept to understand regarding this subject in Thomas’ theology is that Thomas believed God to 
be the absolute perfect being with no potential to be greater. In relation with this concept of God, 
Thomas explains that because evil is the absence of good, and since God is the form of good, all 
evil is merely a privation of His nature. He expresses this as follows, “As the term good signifies 
‘perfect being,’ so the term evil signifies nothing else than ‘privation of perfect being.’”22 This 
view of God also requires Thomas to ascribe to beliefs such as God not having a body, God not 
having any accidental properties, and God being a “simple” being, meaning that His essential 
properties are indiscernible from one another.23 
 Thomas clarifies his beliefs concerning God not having a body and being a simple being 
when he argues, “If when we say ‘God is good’, nothing is signified other than that God is the 
cause of goodness in things, in the same way it should be possible to say that God is a body 
because he is the cause of bodies. Similarly, in saying that God is a body, one separates that he is 
only a being in potentiality, as prime matter is.”24 In other words, matter is spatially and 
temporally finite as oppose to limitless; this being the nature of corporeal entities, it is an 
impossibility for God to be both pure actuality and have a body. In this same sense, Thomas 
argues that if God were not a simple being, then one’s ability to distinguish between God’s 
attributes would be an observation of (for instance) God’s justice ending at one point and His 
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grace beginning at another.25 This is a contradiction within the being of God according to 
Thomas. In order for God to be the greatest possible being, God must be simple—which makes 
Him indivisible. 
 Another characteristic of Thomas’ view of God is that He has no accidental properties. 
The obvious antithesis to this proposal is to claim that God has only essential properties. Thomas 
believes that God cannot have accidental properties, because yet again this would mean that 
there were some type or capacity of potentiality in God.26 However, since God is pure actuality, 
He has no accidental properties, and the properties that He does have are essential and even 
necessary for God to have. The necessity of these attributes is not due to some type of a 
dependence that God has on them; rather they are essential to His nature. Without any one of His 
attributes God would be a different being than He is. It is in this sense that all of God’s attributes 
are necessary and none of which can be accidental. 
The glaring similarities between Anselm and Thomas’ conceptions of God were carried 
into modern philosophy and are chronicled by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz when he opens his 
Discourse on Metaphysics by saying, “The most widely accepted and meaningful notion that we 
have of God is expressed well enough in these words, that God is an absolutely perfect being…it 
is appropriate to remark that there are several entirely different perfections in nature, that God 
possesses all of them together, and that each of them belongs to him in the highest degree.”27 
This is the foundation that Divine Utilitarianism is built upon. This definition of God is that 
which has been regarded and held by many throughout the centuries following Anselm and 
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Thomas. In fact, it is renowned enough that when discussing the “idea of God” in Philosophy of 
Religion, William Rowe includes both Anselm’s and Thomas’ views as the framework for what 
he understands theists meaning by “God”.28 The significance of the idea that God is the greatest 
conceivable being as well as the greatest possible being is indispensable for the theory of Divine 
Utilitarianism, and this is because of what follows from this understanding of God. For those 
who ascribe to the Anselmian and/or Thomistic understanding of God’s nature, God ultimately 
becomes synonymous or identical with the greatest good in existence. 
A Definition of Utility 
 The aim of Divine Utilitarianism (clearly) is to establish that God does all things for the 
sake of “the greatest good for the greatest number”, but in order to determine the validity of this 
conclusion one must have a correct understanding of what the greatest good is and what is meant 
by utility. In order to achieve this, gradations of good and the identity of the “greatest good” will 
be explored according to Augustine and this will be corroborated by other theistic thinkers. 
Following this, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill’s belief in pleasure as utility and his 
proposition that some pleasures are higher than others will be explicated. Once these issues are 
considered and a thorough understanding of God and of utility has been established, the 
supposed and likely utility of God may be elucidated upon.29 
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Augustine and the Good 
Throughout his writings Augustine discerns different gradations of goodness and 
recognizes God as the pinnacle of goodness. At the beginning of his Confessions Augustine 
describes and praises God by simply identifying some of His attributes, “Most high, most 
excellent, most potent, most omnipotent; most merciful and most just; most secret and most truly 
present; most beautiful and most strong.”30 By claiming that something or someone is the 
“most…” one is assuming that some things are lower and some are higher qualitatively, and in 
this case Augustine is acknowledging God as the being which displays and exemplifies the 
aforementioned attributes maximally. This is no odd phenomenon in Augustine’s work either; 
rather it is a theme throughout his writings. In his Soliloquia he records a philosopher’s prayer, in 
that prayer he refers to God repetitiously as a maximal degree or standard of great-making 
attributes. For instance, “O God the Truth…O God the Wisdom…O God the True and Highest 
Life…O God the Blessed Happiness…O God the Good and Beautiful in whom and by whom 
and through whom all things that are good and beautiful are good and beautiful.”31 A significant 
distinction needs to be made here between the difference in ascribing an attribute to something 
and identifying something as the example or standard of an attribute. To claim that a judge’s 
sentencing was just is quite different from saying that a judge’s sentencing is now the standard of 
justice throughout the land. Here, Augustine has not said that God is good; rather he has said that 
God is the Good. In other words, when degrees of goodness are being discussed by Bentham, 
Mill, and other utilitarians, Augustine would claim that God is the standard by which they are 
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comparing and understanding “good” by. God is not only good, God is the Good, and further 
still, God is the distributor and sustainer of all good things according to Augustine. 
 Augustine (by far) is not alone when he identifies God as the distributor and sustainer of 
good, or more specifically as the Good. Thomas explained in his Summa Contra Gentiles, 
“Nothing…will be called good except in so far as it has a certain likeness of the divine 
goodness.”32 Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump go further in explaining why –rather than 
merely that— it is that that God is commonly understood as the Good, “the actualization of a 
thing’s specifying potentialities is, to the extent of the actualization, that thing’s being whole, 
complete, free from defect—the state all things naturally aim at; it is in this sense that the thing is 
said to have goodness.”33 On this notion, if God has no potentiality and is pure actuality as 
Thomas contends, then God is rightly identified as the Good because He exemplifies “goodness” 
to its maximal actuality. Therefore, under the construct of classical theism, God is the Good. 
This truth is echoed passionately by David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls as well, 
In some important sense we wish to argue that God just is the ultimate Good. This view, 
too, has a venerable history within Christianity. Thomists, Anselmians, theistic Platonists, 
and theistic activists, including such contemporary analytic philosophers as Alvin 
Plantinga and Robert Adams, all concur that on a Christian understanding of reality, God 
and the ultimate Good are ontologically inseparable.34 
This certainly establishes that in classical theism God is the Good, but this is not enough by itself 
to make a compelling case for Divine Utilitarianism. As was stated at the beginning of this 
section, the aim of Divine Utilitarianism is to establish that God does all things for the sake of 
“the greatest good for the greatest number.” At this point all that has been concluded is that God 
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Himself is the greatest good; in order to discern whether God is concerned with utilitarianism 
whatsoever, an understanding of utility must be possessed and that utility must align with God’s 
nature and desire. 
Bentham and Mill on Utility 
 The father of utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham addressed what he meant by utility in the 
first chapter of his political philosophy work An Introduction to the Principles of Moral 
Legislation. This chapter is opened with a section entitled “Mankind governed by pain and 
pleasure.”35 Bentham believes pain and pleasure to be intrinsically bad and good respectively. By 
this he means that pleasure is something that humans associate as a good thing and not bad 
whatsoever, and the converse is true of pain; this is how Bentham arrives at the conclusion that 
utility (specifically happiness/pleasure) is the basis of most human decisions. 
In a later chapter Bentham observes that all laws either have or ought to have as their end 
the augmenting of happiness in a community, which includes the minimization of “mischief”.36 
Elsewhere Bentham challenges those that are averse to utilitarianism to adjudicate by which 
other criterion they would judge or make decisions by if not happiness. In this thought 
experiment the objector to utilitarianism is told, “if there be, let him examine and satisfy himself 
whether the principle he thinks he has found is really any separate intelligible principle; or 
whether it be not a mere principle in words, a kind of phrase, which at bottom expresses neither 
more nor less than the mere averment of his own unfounded sentiments; that is, what in another 
person he might be apt to call caprice?”37 This interaction with a skeptic of utilitarianism reveals 
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that Bentham had little regard for alternative principles which guide decision-making faculties. 
In fact, it seems as if Bentham sees these supposed alternatives as naïve and fabricated attempts 
aimed at disassociating with the term “utility” rather than aiming at truth. However, Bentham 
chose the “greatest happiness principle” to be that by which he determined whether actions, 
decisions, legislations, and the like are in line with the Good or not—because pleasure/happiness 
is an intrinsically good thing which is (by God’s design, for theists) interwoven into every 
decision as a determining factor. 38  It may also be noted here that Bentham’s “greatest happiness 
principle” is reminiscent of Augustine’s understanding of the gradations of good. 
In the same way that goodness has different degrees, there are higher and lower degrees 
of happiness as well, and this is the criterion by which utilitarians make their decisions. As 
Bentham argues in favor for, utilitarians adjudicate based on what they believe will bring about 
the greatest good (happiness) for the greatest number. Bentham’s prize student and prodigy John 
Stuart Mill substantially expounded upon Bentham’s utilitarian ethic throughout his career and 
created a more exhaustive understanding of this ethical theory. He corroborates Bentham’s 
association of pleasure with utility vehemently when he tells critics of utilitarianism, 
Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to 
Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility meant by it, not something 
contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; 
and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always 
declared that the useful means these among other things.39 
Directly following his approbation of utility and pleasure being two sides of the same coin, Mill 
continues his agreement with Bentham’s utilitarianism. “The creed which accepts as the 
foundation of morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in 
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proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness.”40 Thus, under a utilitarian ethical construct, an action is good (or in line with the 
Good, one could say) insofar as it promotes happiness. This explication of utilitarian ethics 
connotes that one’s decisions can promote happiness in varying capacities; the capacity of 
happiness which is promoted is dependent on the object or activity which one is involved with 
and its capability to promote happiness. 
 Bentham acknowledges that there is an obvious distinction in capacities of 
goodness/happiness in his famous (or infamous) article “Greatest Happiness of the Greatest 
Number”.41 He believed as Mill did, that one ought to strive to promote maximal happiness in 
one’s decisions. Different from Mill however, Bentham had a list of criteria which allowed one 
to quantify and measure the degree to which some thing or action promoted happiness. Some of 
the criteria which happiness ought to be measured by includes: its intensity, its duration, its 
purity, and its extent.42 The former two circumstances are rather self-explanatory; however the 
latter two have a specific meaning for Bentham. By the purity of the happiness produced, 
Bentham means that the degree to which happiness was produced by an action far outweighs the 
degree to which pain was produced. The more happiness and less pain that an action produces, 
increases the quality of purity that the act is measured by. The extent of the happiness produced 
has more to do with the quantity of people involved in and affected by the act. In this instance 
Bentham is “tak[ing] an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be 
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concerned.”43 Considering these variables certainly gives one a much more formidable 
opportunity to discern how to promote the “greatest good” as a utilitarian, but the question of 
whether or not God is concerned with these variables or if God promotes the greatest good for 
the greatest number has yet to be addressed. 
Divine Utilitarianism in the Past 
 In order to adjudicate whether or not God acts intentionally in order to bring about the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, it must first be determined whether or not 
God acts with a particular telos desired or with reason(s) for acting the way that he does. Leibniz 
remarks regarding this matter that in all cases God must have an ends for which He acts. He 
ultimately provides one reason for reaching this conclusion. Before he posits his reasoning for 
believing that God has a purpose for all that He does, Leibniz says that by responding to this 
criticism he is “overlooking the fact that this seems impossible.”44 To Leibniz, this is an 
absurdity for any being, especially an omniscient one. Barring this reservation, Leibniz delivers 
his reason for believing that God cannot perform any action without reason for doing so, “I say 
that this action of God is at the very least not praiseworthy; for all praise must be based on some 
reason, and by hypothesis there is none here. Instead I hold that God does nothing for which he 
does not deserve to be glorified.”45 It is God’s perfection and holiness as the greatest possible 
being which ensures that He not only have reason for His actions, but that those reasons (ends) 
be the greatest purposes possible, His glory through the praise of His creatures. 
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Furthermore, another explanation may be provided here which petitions that God is a 
better being if He does have a purpose (and a consistent purpose) for His actions rather than the 
contrary. For if there is no purpose for God’s actions, then He is capricious and His creatures are 
not necessarily ensured of His will for their good. However, this would make God less than the 
greatest possible being, and this has been shown to be some being other than God. 
Understanding that God does all things with a purpose, it must now be determined by the 
adherents of Divine Utilitarianism what God’s underlying purpose is for His actions in relation to 
mankind. 
 The foundational question that must be asked when adjudicating if God is a utilitarian is 
whether or not God is concerned with human happiness whatsoever. If He is, then one must 
inquire if God orchestrates all things to the ends of human happiness; if He is not concerned with 
human happiness, then one need not look further into the matter because God by definition 
would not be utilitarian without concern of human happiness. William Paley, an eighteenth 
century English clergyman, author, and philosopher published his Moral and Political 
Philosophy in 1785 after being urged to by fellow faculty at Cambridge. Following its 
publication, Moral and Political Philosophy was required reading for admission into Cambridge 
until the twentieth century. While Paley is renowned for his contributions in philosophy of 
religion by way of his discovery of the teleological argument for the existence of God; his most 
famous publication Moral and Political Philosophy has been largely forgotten by most 
philosophers. It is in this work that Paley reveals his beliefs and reasons regarding God’s concern 
for human happiness. 
 Ultimately Paley appeals to his teleological argument for God’s existence when 
answering the question of God’s aim or ends for His actions. He explains quite plainly, “When 
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God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he 
was indifferent and unconcerned about both.”46 Paley goes on to give a fair amount of detail 
explaining how human beings would experience each of these possible realities. For instance, “If 
he had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose…He might have made, for 
example, everything we tasted, bitter; everything we saw, loathsome; everything we touched, a 
sting; every smell a stench; and every sound a discord.”47 God, an omnipotent and omniscient 
being is well within His capabilities to devise a world suited for mankind’s misery, and this 
could have been achieved in many more –and much more offensive— ways than those 
mentioned. Fortunately, this is not the world that mankind finds itself in, so God must either be 
indifferent concerning man’s happiness or He is in fact concerned with man’s happiness and acts 
in an effort to bring about this ends. 
 The probability of God being indifferent or unconcerned with mankind’s happiness 
seems unlikely prima facie. Ultimately, if this were the case one would expect the world to be 
insipid, largely void of pleasure and pain, but this is not the state of affairs that mankind 
experiences. Nearly all (if not all) actions have pleasurable or painful consequences. Furthermore 
reminiscent of his teleological argument; Paley argues that “if he had been indifferent about our 
happiness or misery, we must impute to our good fortune (as all design by this supposition is 
excluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects 
fitted to produce it. But either of these (and still more both of them) [are] too much to be 
attributed to accident.”48 Paley acknowledges as well that the world human beings find 
themselves in is not bland, rather it is fitted for mankind’s enjoyment and flourishing, but he 
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goes a step further to say that if God was not the agent that fitted the world for mankind’s 
enjoyment, then accident is to credit for this outstanding mishap. However, as Paley explains in 
his teleological argument, and as is explained in all theistic arguments for design, the probability 
of accident being the cause of a functioning universe is infinitesimal – much less a functioning 
universe that is so well suited for human pleasure.49 It is these two weaknesses in the divine 
indifference hypothesis which cause Paley to claim, “Nothing remains but the first supposition, 
that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness; and made for them the 
provision which he has made, with that view, and for that purpose.”50 
 It is at this point in Paley’s Moral and Political Philosophy that Paley has eliminated the 
propositions which claim that God either had nefarious or indifferent aims in creating mankind. 
These eliminations left only the possibility of God desiring and aiming at mankind’s happiness in 
His act of creation. For Paley, as the father of the teleological argument it is of no surprise that 
he appeals to its usefulness in his effort to establish that God is not only Creator and Sustainer, 
but He also acts in a utilitarian way in relation with mankind. It is by this observation of the 
design of the universe that Paley discredited opposing views, and it is by this observation that he 
establishes the strength of Divine Utilitarianism, 
The world abounds with contrivances: and all the contrivances which we are acquainted 
with, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no doubt, exists; but is never, that we can 
perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching 
now and then, is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable from it: or even, if you 
will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a 
distinction which well deserves to be attended to.51 
                                                          
49 Jordan Howard Sobel, Logic and Theism: Arguments for and Against Beliefs in God (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 238-257. 
50 William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 46. 
51 Ibid. 
32 
 
In short, Paley is exposing the reality that for millennia theists have espoused Augustine’s 
doctrine that evil is merely a privation of good, but have taken for granted the reciprocal 
implication of this statement. Paley is uncovering a powerful yet obvious truth that God is not 
only good, He is the Good, and any evil in the world is a deviation from or privation of His 
design. Therefore it follows that an ends (telos, purpose, etc.) which God desires of His actions is 
the common good of mankind. 
 This brings Paley to his final assertion on the matter of God’s will. Recall that the entire 
purpose of adjudicating whether God created with the purpose of human happiness, misery, or 
neither was to discern which of these aligns with God’s will. With this in view, Paley says, 
We conclude, therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And 
this conclusion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon 
it, namely, ‘that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the 
light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the 
general happiness.’52 
Ultimately, Paley arrives at Divine Utilitarianism by observing the world and its regularities, and 
recognizing that God created intentionally with mankind’s happiness and flourishing in mind. 
Paley rightfully determines that God would have been well within His capabilities to create a 
world much less hospitable for mankind, but that is not the state of affairs that the human species 
finds itself in. Rather, the world is created –seemingly— for the ends of human happiness and 
thriving. Leibniz records a similar understanding of a connection between God’s nature and 
human happiness and articulates this discovery as follows, “God, possessing infinite wisdom, 
acts in the most perfect manner, not only metaphysically, but also morally speaking, and that, 
with respect to ourselves, we can say that the more enlightened and informed we are about God’s 
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works, the more we will be disposed to find them excellent and in complete conformity with 
what we might have desired.”53 It is from this shared observation that Paley determines that God 
wills for the common good of mankind and that it follows that God is a utilitarian in His actions 
relating to mankind. 
 Although an unpopular stance throughout history, Divine Utilitarianism was held by 
another eighteenth century English philosopher as well.54 John Gay ascribed to Divine 
Utilitarianism in his work A Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle and Immediate 
Criterion of Virtue.55 Although Gay arrives at Divine Utilitarianism by means of a different 
argument, he expresses the same conclusion and attempts to promulgate the same understanding 
of God and ethics that Paley does in his treatment of the issue. Gay argues, “Now it is evident 
from the nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his 
goodness manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than 
their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore the means of their happiness.”56 
Whereas Paley appealed to God’s creation as evidence for his being a utilitarian; Gay appeals to 
God’s nature and His continued interaction with creation as evidence of Divine Utilitarianism. 
God was happy throughout eternity past (since God is pure actuality, and happiness/pleasure is a 
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great-making attribute, one may justifiably assume this), therefore one is warranted in assuming 
that God desired happiness to be experienced by His creatures as well. This point is further 
understood by observation of God’s interactions with His creation, or His “works” as Gay calls 
them. 
One does not observe a devastating tornado or the subjugation of a body by a cancerous 
disease and remark upon it “what a miracle, thank God.” This would equate to nonsense in this 
world; rather as Paley says, these instances of evil are merely privations of God’s goodness in 
this world. This is why the term miracle is reserved for instances such as tornadoes redirecting 
their routes to miss a home or a crop, or for cases of terminal cancers being reversed. These are 
the types of situations that are coined miraculous and related with God, and these are the types of 
circumstances Gay is referring to when he says, “His goodness manifested in his works”57 In 
Gay’s eyes, it is God’s nature and the occasions wherein God chooses to intervene with creation 
that renown His goodness and are evidence of His zeal for the happiness for mankind. 
Paley and Gay’s arguments for Divine Utilitarianism appeal to widely accepted beliefs in 
theism such as God creating, God being happy in and through Himself, and God performing 
miracles in the world. However, these thinkers add that God created in such a way that it 
promotes the common happiness of mankind, that God being Good desires mankind to 
experience happiness similar to the way that He does, and that miracles are evidence of God 
interfering with the world in order to bring about a greater intensity, duration, and/or extent of 
human happiness. These motivations are not averse to the nature of God; rather they are aligned 
with God’s nature and make good sense of many of God’s actions. In the same way that these 
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arguments interact with God’s nature in order to arrive at answers for questions such as, why 
does God do what He does in relation to mankind or what is God’s motivation when He acts; a 
new argument for Divine Utilitarianism will appeal to God’s nature (particularly the classical 
understanding of God as the Good) in an effort to answer whether God is utilitarian in His ethics 
and why God does what He does. 
New Divine Utilitarianism 
This new argument for Divine Utilitarianism does not counteract or cancel out the 
arguments on the theory’s behalf from the past, rather it approaches the topic from a different 
angle so to speak and is therefore capable of answering different –yet germane— questions on 
the topic. This new Divine Utilitarianism may be summarized as follows, P1) Relationship with 
God is the greatest good/happiness a human being can experience. P2) God desires as many 
human beings to have relationship with Him as possible. P3) Utilitarians desire the greatest 
good/happiness for as many human beings as possible. C) Therefore God is a utilitarian because 
He desires the greatest good for as many human beings as possible. Although the premises of 
this argument have been available and even agreed upon for centuries they have never been 
combined in order to make an argument for God as a utilitarian. Furthermore there are arguments 
(such as Paley’s and Gay’s) for Divine Utilitarianism –as has been shown above— however they 
do not use the same reasons that are used in new Divine Utilitarianism. Thus although neither the 
premises nor the conclusion of this argument are novel, their combination and formulation as an 
argument are. This is precisely what makes new Divine Utilitarianism new. These phrases have 
not been argued for before, collectively. This being recognized, there must be a reason that these 
phrases have not been argued for collectively. This is either because their correlation was 
unrecognized, their conclusion was undesirable, or a component of or the entire argument is 
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fallacious. The aim of this presentation of new Divine Utilitarianism is to put these suppositions 
to rest and establish good reasons for believing that God does all things for the sake of the 
greatest good for the greatest number. 
Relationship with God is the greatest good/happiness a human being can experience. 
 It was claimed earlier (corroborated by Augustine and Thomas) that God is the Good. If 
this is in fact the case as classical theism attests, then it is a mere tautology to claim that 
relationship between God and human beings is the greatest good that humans can hope to attain. 
A review of the literature concerning classical theism and God as the Good exhibits a clear link 
between these claims. This idea of relationship with God as the greatest good for sentient, 
rational, free beings appears to necessarily follow in classical theism for thinkers such as 
Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas. Each of these men express their passionate belief that 
relationship with God is the greatest good humans can experience. 
Joseph Clair explains in his recent research on Augustine’s concept of the Good that, 
“Augustine’s conception of ethical goodness is also interwoven with his account of happiness. 
The highest good for humankind—a happy life—is achieved when one clings to the supreme 
good.”58 Augustine corroborates this when he says of God, “He is the source of our happiness 
and the very end of all our aspirations…We pursue Him with our love so that when we reach 
Him we may rest in perfect happiness in the One who is our goal.”59 Anselm dedicates the final 
four sections of his Proslogion to understanding the extent of God’s goodness and the degree to 
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which relationship with Him brings joy and happiness to human beings. He begins by asking, “If 
particular goods are enjoyable, consider carefully how enjoyable is that good which contains the 
joyfulness of all goods; not such as we have experienced in created things, but as different from 
this as the Creator differs from the creature.”60 He answers his own query in the following 
section of the Proslogion by expressing that, “to the degree that each one loves some other, so he 
will rejoice in the good of that other; therefore, just as each one in that perfect happiness will 
love God incomparably more than himself and all others with him, so he will rejoice 
immeasurably more over the happiness of God than over his own happiness and that of all the 
others with him.”61 Anslem’s answer as to the quantity of joy that is experienced when in 
relation to God is essentially that one’s joy is only limited by the capacity in which one loves 
God. As the source of happiness and the Good, relationship with God is an incomprehensible 
joy, and the closer one is to God, the more joy one will experience. Thomas corroborates this 
position thoroughly and concisely in his Shorter Summa, “This ultimate end of man we call 
beatitude. For a man’s happiness or beatitude consists in the vision whereby he sees God in His 
essence. Of course, man is far below God in the perfection of his beatitude. For God has this 
beatitude by his very nature, whereas man attains beatitude by being admitted to a share in the 
divine light.”62 Again, it is consistently attested to that the telos of man is happiness and that this 
is found ultimately in the God of classical theism. 
All human decisions result in either greater pleasure and lesser pain, or the inverse; this 
includes the relationships that human beings choose to participate in, these have the same effect 
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on one’s experience of pleasure and pain. God is the greatest being in existence, He is the Good 
and there is no privation of goodness in God since He is pure actuality. Furthermore, God is the 
source of happiness. Therefore relationship between human beings and God results in the 
greatest amount of happiness (and good) that can be experienced by human beings. John 
Wesley’s corroboration of this theory is expressed in an anthology of his works, “no account of 
human flourishing is complete that doesn’t include communion with God, man’s summum 
bonum is impossible apart from reconciliation and fellowship with God.”63 This is clearly not 
merely an ancient or medieval concept either; happiness in God has been seen by popular theists 
as the purpose of human existence as recently as the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Well known Cambridge and Oxford professor as well as prolific author, C. S. Lewis 
ascribes to this view of human satisfaction and the happiness that relationship with God provides 
throughout his writings. He remarks on the subject saying that, “out of that hopeless attempt [to 
find a substitute for God] has come nearly all that we call human history—money, poverty, 
ambition, war, prostitution, classes, empires, slavery—the long terrible story of man trying to 
find something other than God which will make him happy.”64 This passage displays Lewis’ 
understanding of history and the societies and individuals throughout that have all attempted to 
replace God with what is (by comparison) fleeting, frivolous, and unsatisfying. This quotation as 
well as others throughout Lewis’ writings convey the idea that although there are actions and 
objects which arouse one’s affections, these ultimately amount to “mud pies in a slum.”65 The 
actions and objects that produce happiness in human beings do so in direct proportion that they 
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reflect the goodness of God and the happiness that He produces.66 God created the world in this 
way (according to Lewis) in order to provoke a longing within human beings that only God can 
fulfill. Humans consistently interact with objects and actions which bring about happiness, but 
only as a reflection of the happiness that Augustine, Anselm, Thomas, and Lewis claim as the 
greatest happiness. David Baggett and Jerry Walls contend that even the concept of morality is a 
construct built into this world that provokes longing in human beings for relationship with God. 
In their book dedicated to the topic of God and ethics they state that, “The voice of morality is 
the call of God to return to our only true and ultimate source of happiness.”67 Given these 
attestations of the happiness that follows from relationship with God; it is well founded to 
propose that relationship with God is the greatest good/happiness a human being can 
experience. 
God desires as many human beings to have relationship with Him as possible. 
 There are at least three major reasons for believing that the above statement is true. 
Firstly, God’s nature (i.e. His goodness, His benevolence, His grace, etc.) is such that He could 
not desire other than the maximization of these attributes as expressed in relation to other beings. 
Secondly, God desires the happiness of His creatures, as claimed by William Paley. Finally, one 
of God’s great-making attributes is that He is a personal being, meaning that He necessarily has 
relationships with other beings and desires these relationships. These further explanations of 
God’s nature taken singularly would be arguably purposive enough to merit a significant 
response regarding the validity of the above statement, however taken as an aggregate they work 
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to provide a cumulative case for God’s desire to have relationship with as many rational, 
sentient, and free beings as possible. 
 Before these reasons are explored some explanation may be necessary for the sake of 
clarity. In particular, the notion of what is “possible” in regard to the issue at hand (relationship 
with God). Furthermore there may be some necessity for clarity as to what is meant by 
“relationship” with God as well. As to the former ambiguity of God desiring as many human 
beings to have relationship with Him as possible; the confusion arises in this terminology that 
connotes a limitation as to the quantity of human beings which may have relationship with God. 
One’s initial impulse upon hearing this qualifier of possibility is to inquire why relationship with 
God is limited in any capacity. 
This is a warranted skepticism. After all, if God truly is pure actuality and the greatest 
possible being, then it is contradictory to claim that there is some type of limitation to or 
deficiency in His goodness or power. This elicits an age-old question in philosophy. This 
question is usually poised in regard to God’s nature and the problem of evil, but with a bit of 
augmenting, the question accurately addresses the concern felt when it is said that God desires as 
many human beings to have relationship with Him as possible. “Is he willing to [have 
relationship with man], but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he 
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then [do not all men have relationship with 
God]?”68 The limitation of who or how many may have relationship with God must therefore be 
on the recipients (human beings) and not on the initiator (God), if God is the greatest possible 
being. Although God is the Good, the source of happiness, and the ends for which mankind was 
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created, it is inevitable that significantly free, sentient, and rational beings will forego this Source 
and settle for mere reflections or imitations of the happiness that relationship with God 
provides.69 This is due to the human’s natural propensity to inaccurately assess qualitative value 
in terms of goodness. 
Human beings are lower than their Creator in –all regards, but particularly in view here 
is— rationality and morality, so their ability to correctly assess what is good and even more so 
what is the greatest Good is considerably diminished. It is this inability that apprehends the 
human mind and affections. Another explanation for this disclaimer of possibility has to do with 
the nature of relationships. It would be unethical for God to force anyone into relationship with 
Him. So for those human beings that attend to lower happiness than is found in God, He does not 
suppress or diminish their will in order to achieve relationship with them; rather He allows their 
freedom to be utilized in order that their personhood may not be suppressed in any way. This in 
itself is a good act of God on His creatures. Even if a human being misses the boundless 
happiness found only in the opportunity of relationship of God; He allows their freedom and 
desires to be apprehended by other means. This is not God’s withholding of a good, rather it is an 
act of goodness from Creator to creature. In this way, the stipulation that the greatest good is 
only experienced by some and not all of the human population, is not an inhibition of God’s 
character but evidence of His abounding goodness. 
Similarly, God’s nature is such that He can do no other than desire and display His great-
making attributes to their maximal degree. If God did not desire these attributes to be carried out, 
then He would be less good; as He would be desiring less than the greatest good for His 
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creatures. If God did not display His attributes in this way (to their maximal degree) then He 
would only be the greatest possible being in theory, in other words, He would have potentiality, 
and there is no potentiality in God since He is pure actuality.70 
Moreover, God not only desires the maximization of His attributes, God also desires the 
happiness of His creatures does so for the sake of joy—in them and in Himself.71 For God to 
create beings capable of experiencing pain and happiness in such immense degrees as human 
beings and then to desire other than their ultimate Good would amount to cruelty. This would 
(nearly) be equivalent to a mother and father that are perfectly capable of providing for their 
children emotionally, financially, and otherwise yet being either indifferent or outright neglectful 
toward their children’s well-being. God is not this type of Creator, He is wholly good and loves 
His creatures not obligatorily but willfully. In the same sense that it is a greater good for parents 
to love their children and desire to bring about their greatest good for the sake of joy (in the 
children and parents) as oppose to obligation; it is a greater good for God to desire the happiness 
of His creatures in this way. As the greatest possible being, God must wish and will for the 
happiness of His creatures in this way, for Him to do less would make Him a less great being, 
thus He would not be God. So God not only desires the happiness of human beings, but He does 
so in the greatest possible way. 
Finally, a great-making attribute is to be a personal being as oppose to an impersonal or 
isolated being, so God not only has relationships with other beings but He also desires these 
relationships. It is inherently good to have reciprocally desired relationship with the greatest 
possible being. The closer one is in relationship with God, the better that state of affairs and the 
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benefits therein become. It is better that His attributes be experienced by the agents that He 
creates than not; this makes being personal a great-making attribute for God. If God created, yet 
harbored His goodness for Himself and not His created ones, then He would be less good than 
possible (as explained above). A further note to be considered in this regard, some of God’s 
attributes could not be exemplified without creatures, for instance God’s grace, forgiveness, and 
justice. In this way, God has relationships necessarily in order to bring about displays of His 
great-making attributes. God is also necessarily in relationship to created beings in that He is 
creator, and they, His creations.72 God desires relationship with human beings precisely because 
He desires their greatest good. This is a two-fold act of goodness on behalf of God. Firstly, His 
creatures are afforded an opportunity to experience the greatest reservoir of goodness in 
existence and become acquainted with the ends for which they were created. Secondly, God 
displays His great-making attributes and they are accepted and appreciated by free, rational, 
sentient beings. Thus, God desires as many human beings to have relationship with Him as 
possible insofar as it displays His great-making attributes and His creatures are willing to 
experience the greatest good in existence. 
Therefore God is a utilitarian because He desires the greatest good for as many human beings as 
possible. 
 As was seen in the survey of Bentham and Mill’s literature, utilitarians by definition 
desire and act for the greatest good of the greatest number of people possible, and it was 
recognized in the study of classical theism that God is the greatest Good and happiness possible. 
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Following this line of thought, the argument for the theory of Divine Utilitarianism states that 
one of God’s great-making attributes is to will and wish the utmost happiness of His creatures 
since this makes Him a greater being than the antithesis. For the sake of tolerance and the pursuit 
of truth, let alternatives to this hypothesis be considered. If God does not desire the greatest 
good/happiness for the greatest number of people possible, then He wishes either a lesser degree 
of happiness to be available to human beings or less people to experience the greatest degree of 
happiness. Neither of these alternatives are plausible for the greatest possible being; for they 
would make God into either a nefarious being of the worst degree or a possessive potentate 
authority which is in some capacity indifferent toward human happiness. In light of these 
considerations and their implications, that relationship with God is the greatest good one can 
experience and that God desires relationship with as many human beings as possible, it may be 
deduced that therefore God is a utilitarian because He desires the greatest good for as many 
human beings as possible. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHICS OF GOD 
 Before this case for Divine Utilitarianism is closed a comparison must be made. After all, 
it is not as if Divine Utilitarianism is the only theory on the topic of God’s ethics. The 
mainstream and far more popular view concerning the ethics of God is commonly referred to as 
Divine Command Theory. In order to honestly represent Divine Utilitarianism one must address 
its’ alternative and determine which of these theories more adequately explains the nature of God 
in this regard. In this attempt to accurately and most thoroughly understand God’s ethical nature 
as it relates to mankind, the explanatory power of both Divine Command Theory and Divine 
Utilitarianism will be assessed. The aim of this juxtaposition will be to establish the superiority 
of Divine Utilitarianism as opposed to Divine Command Theory in its capability to convey 
information regarding the nature of God. 
Divine Command Theory: A Juxtaposition 
 This view of ethics supposes (and rightly so) that “the divine will is not subject to any 
principle, and God controls all truths including moral truths.”73 As the greatest possible being 
and Creator of all that exists (besides Himself), God is neither subject to nor reliant on anything. 
Furthermore, as the Creator and Sustainer of all created things, God is the Creator and Sustainer 
of the moral law. The nature of laws is that they are instituted by a free and intelligent agent. 
This means that the moral law must have been instituted (or created) by a free and intelligent 
being, and since the moral law transcends humanity and is not reliant on mankind, it must have 
been created by some other being—the Creator of all things, God. Divine Command Theory not 
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only claims that God created the moral law, but that the moral law is whatever God declares.74 In 
other words, as the instituter, Creator, and author of the moral law, what God says is right to do 
or wrong to do is in fact the case, and these declarations are moral law because they are given by 
the moral law giver.75 
 Two criticisms that frequently arise against this theory are the claims that 1) Divine 
Command Theory makes it possible for God to command evil actions to become good actions 
and 2) that morality is arbitrary on this view. The first criticism is easily enough refuted; it 
merely requires that one remind oneself of the framework within which Divine Command 
Theory works (i.e. classical theism). God, the greatest possible being by definition, cannot wish 
or will evil to be done; rather He desires the greatest good possible for the greatest number of 
people. This can never mean that God commands evil, for this would make God less than the 
greatest possible being. As for the second objection to Divine Command Theory, most adherents 
of this theory respond in a similar fashion. Baggett and Walls provide a response which explains 
“that all of God’s commands are deeply resonant with his character, and that divine command 
theory must be built on the foundation of God’s loving nature.” They go on to explain that 
because this is the case, God’s “commands don’t lack good reasons” and “Divine command 
theory does not make God capricious.”76 So then, it is God’s nature and His necessary goodness 
which ensures that all of His moral declarations are good and that they cannot be other than 
good. 
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What Divine Command Theory Explains 
 As expressed above, Divine Command Theory communicates two major ideas 
concerning God and morality. Firstly, God is the Creator, sustainer, and instituter of morality. In 
this way, He is the moral law giver. Secondly, as the moral law giver, whatever declarations or 
commands that God gives concerning moral action becomes moral law due to His moral 
authority as Creator and instituter of the law, thus providing an explanation of what is good. So 
the explanatory power of Divine Command Theory may be accurately and concisely summarized 
by saying that the theory explains what God does in relation to mankind and ethics and that it 
effectively communicates what constitutes a good or right action as well as a reprehensible 
action. In effect, this theory answers the question of what God does by simply stating that God 
defines the moral law and whatever actions are aligned with this divine will are good based upon 
their conformity to the divine will. However, merely answering what God does and what is good 
seems to be a fairly low bar of explanatory power. 
What Divine Command Theory Fails to Explain 
Although Divine Command Theory articulates what God does in terms of morality and 
mankind; this is of profoundly little use in terms of what one desires an ethical system to explain. 
As soon as a rather thorough explication of God’s nature is heard, one might expect for morality 
to be contingent on whatever actions reflect the nature and will of this perfect being. With this in 
mind, Divine Command Theory does not come as a surprise to the person that understands 
“God” in classical theistic terms; rather it leaves the classical theist wanting more answers. One 
might even appeal that Divine Command Theory is a tautology for the classical theist, because 
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he already understands the Good to be God and good actions to be in line with God’s will. 
William Alston goes so far in his article “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” as 
to liken the phrases “is morally wrong” and “is contrary to a command of God” with “water” and 
“H2O”.77 This reinforces the previous claim that Divine Command Theory merely purports 
tautologies for classical theists. It is the case that Divine Command Theory also gives an 
explanation of what is right or good, ethically speaking.78 However, again, this is a tautology for 
classical theists that follow the thought of Augustine, Anselm, or Thomas.  
Alston goes further still with his criticism of Divine Command Theory by claiming that 
the theory suffers from at least two serious weaknesses. First, he cites the common objection to 
Divine Command Theory which was given a brief treatment above. This objection makes 
morality arbitrary depending on God’s propensity toward capriciousness. Second, Alston 
contends that Divine Command Theory creates a type of Euthyphro dilemma.79 He formulates 
this potential dilemma as follows, “Is it that: 2. We ought to, e.g., love one another because God 
commands us to do so. or is it that: 3. God commands us to love one another because that is what 
we ought to do.”80 In regards to Alston’s objection of arbitrariness, what is at stake here is the 
objectivity or subjectivity of morality. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong expresses this same hesitation 
toward Divine Command Theory when he states that, “even if God in fact never would or could 
command us to rape, the divine command theory still implies the counterfactual that, if God did 
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command us to rape, then we would have a moral obligation to rape. That is absurd.”81 The 
typical responses that Divine Command theorists provide in regard to this indictment state that 
the objection is predicated upon mere counterfactuals and non-possibilities, therefore the 
objection is irrelevant and obsolete.82 As for the second objection that Alston marshals against 
Divine Command Theory, the adherent to the theory must discern some way in which two ends 
are satisfied. 1) The establishing that neither the objectivity of morality nor the intrinsic 
goodness of God are impugned and 2) Divine Command Theory is true. This may prove to be a 
worthy challenge for the theory since it seems (as Alston has communicated) that the two –God 
and morality— are dependent upon one another in some sense. 
Finally, if the answers that Divine Command Theory provides are unsatisfying and the 
objections to the theory are insurmountable, then one must seek to answer deeper, more 
substantive questions regarding the ethical framework that God utilizes in his relations with 
mankind. For instance, the subject of why God does what He does which is thoroughly dealt with 
in Divine Utilitarianism, but is hardly (if at all) addressed by Divine Command Theory. 
Furthermore, one may desire to associate an ethical theory with God which does not suffer from 
the objections of arbitrariness and a sort of quasi-Euthyphro dilemma. 
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What Divine Utilitarianism Explains 
 Divine Utilitarianism is deeply concerned with understanding why God does what He 
does. Although adherents of Divine Utilitarianism would agree with Divine Command Theorists 
that God is the moral law giver and that whatever He declares as a good or reprehensible action 
is as He says; the believer in Divine Utilitarianism would say that this is not substantive enough 
or satisfactory in explaining the ethics of God. Thus, while it does convey some information 
concerning the ethics of God; it does not provide an exhaustive treatment of the subject, whereas 
Divine Utilitarianism works to explain why God acts in the way that He does with mankind and 
ethics. The qualitative difference in what one does and why one does something can be clearly 
seen given a myriad of ethical situations. 
For instance, it may be difficult for one to justify the actions of a person lying, stealing, 
or killing if one is only afforded an explanation of what was perpetrated (i.e. the lying, stealing 
killing). These actions may be swiftly accepted in certain circumstances though, such as lying to 
a Nazi officer in order to save the lives of Jewish citizens, stealing in an effort to feed one’s 
starving family, or killing one nefarious person so that many righteous people may live. The only 
difference in the former and the latter set of actions is the context. This is to say that what 
happened did not change, however why the actions took place provided such a great amount of 
information that it often causes one to reconsider a strictly deontological view of these actions. 
This is precisely the reason that situations such as these are referred to as ethical dilemmas. In his 
“Moral Obstacles: An Alternative to the Doctrine of Double Effect” Gerhard Øverland expounds 
on this phenomenon of ethical dilemmas and one’s responsibility to understand why an ethical 
action takes place. The totality of this article is dedicated to establishing that when an ethical 
action is taken by an individual in an ethical dilemma, there is a preferred option, and an option 
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is preferred when it minimizes cost and maximizes good. Regarding ethical actions such as these 
Øverland contends, “to say that it is permissible to impose a certain cost on a person just because 
he has a duty to bear this cost does not solve the problem of justification. We need to know why 
the person has a duty to bear cost in the first place…A [person] has a duty to bear additional cost 
because his presence gives rise to cost, and fairness dictates that he should bear some of it.”83 
This conclusion benefits the case for Divine Utilitarianism in at least two ways. Firstly, it 
emphasizes the significance of understanding why an action is taken (such as, why God does 
what He does in relation to mankind). Secondly, it enables one to recognize that although God 
does not bring all of mankind into relationship with Himself (because of man’s apprehension, not 
God’s—as was seen earlier), when a person does not partake in relationship with God it is 
because fairness dictates that they must bear the responsibility (or cost) of their denial to partake 
in this relationship. In short, the distinction between what God does and why He does it is not an 
insignificant one, and the more satisfactory answer for these inquiries is found in Divine 
Utilitarianism. 
 As expressed throughout this work, Divine Utilitarianism is the belief that God desires 
the greatest good for the greatest number and He acts in relation with mankind in order to bring 
about that end. So as for the query concerning why God does what He does, the abbreviated 
answer of Divine Utilitarianism is that he acts in order that the greatest good may come about for 
the greatest number of human beings—and this good is that they may have relationship with 
God, the Good. A more thorough response to this question on the Divine Utilitarian point of 
view explains that God acts in the way that He does in order to bring human beings into this 
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relationship and that this relationship will produce worship of Himself by these rational, sentient, 
free agents. This reveals another issue which is addressed by Divine Utilitarianism; God’s 
necessity to be worshipped.  
 ‘Necessity’ here does not mean that God needs worship in order to be fulfilled or in order 
to maintain His existence; rather this means that a being that is good to the degree that God is, 
must be worshipped, or demands worship.84 God’s ontology is not dependent or contingent on 
anything, including the degree to which He is worshipped. This expands the explanatory power 
of Divine Utilitarianism, as it is capable of elucidating upon why God necessitates worship and 
how this necessity is fulfilled. Brian Leftow contributes a fair amount of time and effort 
establishing that God is such a being that necessitates worship in his book God and Necessity. 
Working under the assumption of classical theism he says, “If something is a deity, then just qua 
a deity, it intrinsically and objectively is an appropriate object of greatest worship…anything 
deserving greatest worship is in a better state than anything that does not.”85 Leftow refines this 
definition of a being that is worthy and deserving of worship by explaining precisely what he 
means by worship. “Greatest worship is the attitude of greatest respect, admiration, honor, and 
awe, or the activity of expressing this attitude. So something intrinsically and objectively is an 
appropriate object of greatest worship only if it intrinsically and objectively deserves more of 
these than anything not an appropriate object of greatest worship.”86 Understanding Leftow’s 
terminology enables one to determine whether God truly does necessitate worship or if this is 
simply a presupposition made by theists. 
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According to this definition of worship, the only way that God could not be intrinsically 
and objectively worthy of worship (i.e. necessitate worship) would be if there were a being 
which were more deserving of respect, admiration, honor, and awe. However, God is the greatest 
possible being and He possesses and displays all great-making attributes to their maximal degree, 
so there is no being that is greater or more worthy of worship than God. Due to this simple albeit 
profound understanding of God and of worship, it is not logically possible for a being other than 
the classical theistic God to necessitate or be intrinsically and objectively worthy of worship. In 
short, Leftow expresses that God necessitates worship because He is God; He is the being which 
is so great and so good that He cannot exist without being worshipped, and there is no being in 
existence which could possibly force God to abdicate this role. This necessity of worship is 
explained two-fold in Divine Utilitarianism. 
Firstly, because Divine Utilitarianism is built upon the foundation of classical theism, 
God must be worshipped because a being worthy of worship is better than one undeserving of it 
(as Leftow articulates). A skeptic of theism, J. N. Findlay claims that if God is in fact the being 
that Anselm claims Him to be, then He is an “adequate object of religious worship.”87 While 
Findlay denies that God is Anselm’s greatest conceivable being; he admits that such a being 
would necessitate worship if it exists. This astute observation made by theists and skeptics alike 
(as has been adequately shown here); assists in silencing a significant objection which has been 
and –no doubt— will continue to be marshalled against Divine Utilitarianism. 
In his two-volume treatise concerning God’s ethics, James Moody Gustafson strongly 
refutes the idea that God’s ethical system could be consequentialist/utilitarian in nature. 
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Gustafson contends that if God is a utilitarian, then His ethics are not theocentric; rather they are 
anthropocentric, and he finds this to be a terribly impious doctrine.88 However, if God acts as a 
utilitarian, then He will be worshipped as a result of His actions.89 Gustafson seems to entertain 
this notion of Divine Utilitarianism leading to the worship of God when he says that, “the only 
way in which one can have theocentric ethics which finally sustains and supports the idea that 
what God wills is what is good for man is to argue that the good for human beings coincides with 
the ultimate divine purpose. Historically, most of Christian ethics has assumed this to be the 
case.”90 This observation by Gustafson brings a significant distinction of Divine Utilitarianism to 
light. Divine Utilitarianism does not say that all of God’s actions are ultimately aimed at 
anthropocentric ends; rather all that God does is ultimately done for His own glory. However, all 
of God’s actions in relation to human beings are aimed at the happiness of human beings, and 
this results in God being worshipped and glorified. So although God does all things for His own 
glory, His actions towards human beings are aimed at bringing about their greatest 
happiness/good. Thus, although God’s actions may not be as thoroughly or overtly theocentric as 
individuals such as Gustafson would prefer; His actions do in fact work towards the ends of His 
creatures’ happiness and worship of Himself by His creatures. 
Secondly, the purpose for which God acts in Divine Utilitarianism merits and requires 
worship as an appropriate response. God acts in in order to produce the greatest good for the 
greatest number of human beings, which is relationship with their Creator. This relationship 
necessarily results in worship of God by human beings because this relationship gives free, 
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rational, and sentient beings the greatest happiness possible for them and this act of God deserves 
praise. Although the idea of God as a utilitarian is unpopular and it is commonly seen as an 
impious proposal, when one recognizes the effects that God as a utilitarian has on one’s theology 
(such as satisfying His need to be worshipped) one recognizes the immense veneration that 
Divine Utilitarianism conjures in the creature, for the Creator. Mill once remarked on this 
subject, 
We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine. 
If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that 
the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. 
If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and 
that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but 
more profoundly religious than any other.91 
In this way, worship of God is the action which necessarily follows when man gains relationship 
with God (the greatest good/happiness), and it is utilitarian for God to act in order to bring this 
state of affairs about. This is how God satisfies His necessity to be worshipped through the 
construct of Divine Utilitarianism. The explanatory power of Divine Utilitarianism may be 
expanded in at least one more way; by revealing that the idea of God as a utilitarian has been 
appealed to regularly by theists in Philosophy of religion. 
This final revelation concerning the explanatory power of Divine Utilitarianism merely 
makes the distinction that there is already a theistic construct that frames God as a utilitarian in 
His ethics. A standard and widely accepted response that theists give to the problem of evil is 
that God allows evil to exist and occur so that greater goods may occur. Rowe explicates the 
nature of theodicies this way, 
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What a theodicy does endeavor to do is to fasten on some good (real or imaginary) and 
argue that achieving that good would justify an omnipotent being in permitting evils like 
the fawn’s suffering…if obtaining the good in question were God’s aim in permitting 
evils like the fawn’s suffering, then (given what we know) it would be reasonable to 
believe that an omnipotent being would be justified in permitting such evils.92 
Thus, the theists’ best defense against the problem of evil is to hope to convince his opponent 
that the good which results from the occurrence of evil is of a great enough amount or quality 
that it justifies God allowing evil to be perpetrated in the world. In short, “God allows evils to 
happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom.”93 Charles Journet corroborates this view that 
“God permits, indeed, that evils come about so as to draw greater goods from them.”94 
Identifying that theists appeal to God as a utilitarian in order to resolve their most prominent and 
challenging objection puts theists in somewhat of a dilemma. The theist may either say that God 
is not a utilitarian and therefore does not act in order to bring about the greatest good for the 
greatest number, which would cause the theist to abandon their defense of theodicies; or the 
theist can confer that God is in fact a utilitarian and maintain intellectual honesty in holding to 
the concept of theodicies. 
This dilemma is quite significant for a vast majority of theists because most theists do not 
have a consequentialist ethical system, rather they are typically virtue ethicists. The most 
significant issue that virtue ethicists (even more so, theistic virtue ethicists) have with 
utilitarianism is that it allows for evil to be perpetrated in order that a greater good may be 
achieved. This is precisely why this dilemma is so challenging for most theists; they are being 
challenged to accept that their most beloved being (God) allows abhorrent actions to occur in 
                                                          
92 William L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2007), 124-
5. 
93 Jaques Maritain, St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1942), 9-
10.  
94 Charles Journet, The Meaning of Evil (London: Chapman, 1963), 259. 
57 
 
order to bring about some greater good.95 This is the most repulsive and offensive doctrine of 
utilitarianism to most virtue ethicists, so it is understandable that the challenge to accept this 
attribute or action within the ethics of God is a difficult one to accept. However, it seems that 
theists have been accepting God as a utilitarian all along. After all, theodicies have been common 
theistic defenses for millennia.96 So, in effect, although theists have not accepted God as a 
utilitarian being in all of His actions; it seems that they have accepted Him as such when it has 
proved to be helpful. 
This is a particularly difficult reality for most theists to accept because they are not 
comfortable with attributing the Machiavellian concept of “the ends justifying the means” to 
their deity.97 However, if the ends of God’s actions are to bring about states of affairs such as, 
human relationship with Himself, worship of Himself by free, rational, sentient beings, and the 
happiness of His creatures; then the ends for which God acts do in fact justify the means. It is 
these ends which have been promoted and defended throughout this work, and it is these ends 
which God acts in accordance with. 
This expansion in the explanatory power of Divine Utilitarianism has a two-fold effect 
for the theory itself. First, the claim that evil may not be permitted or committed in order to bring 
about some greater good will no doubt be an objection marshalled against Divine Utilitarianism 
as well, so the redirection of this objection toward theodicies will defend Divine Utilitarianism. 
Second, this identification of theodicies as a result of a utilitarian God will cause theists that are 
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averse to utilitarianism to objectively consider the potentiality of God having a utilitarian ethic. 
The objection against the allowance of evil for the outcome of a greater good will be subsided 
one way or another once the theist that is objecting recognizes that he already believes that God 
is utilitarian in exactly this way; that God allows evil in order that greater goods may come 
about. It is appalling to theistic virtue ethicists to think that one could cause pain in order to bring 
about good, but once a skeptic of theism claims that God and evil cannot coexist in the world, 
these theistic virtue ethicists appeal to the utilitarian concept that they find most repulsive in 
hopes of resolving an objection to their worldview. The theist must compromise on some front; 
either God is a utilitarian in His ethics and wills and acts in order to bring about the greatest good 
for the greatest number—which allows for evil in the world in order to bring about greater 
goods, or he does not view God in this way and the theist is in need of reconstructing a response 
to how it is that evil and God (the Good) can coexist.98 
Assessing the Juxtaposition 
 While Divine Command Theory explains what God does in regards to morality, it does 
not seem sufficient for explaining why God does what He does. This theory reveals what makes 
an action right or good by identifying that an action is good insofar as it reflects the nature of 
God. This was claimed to be a tautology for classical theists because it can be deduced or even 
included in one’s understanding of God as a being. Divine Utilitarianism by contrast, explained 
why God does what He does, how God’s necessity to be worshipped is satisfied, and identified 
that theodicies are a utilitarian construct that is appealed to in order to justify the coexistence of 
God and evil. Given this juxtaposition of these two competing theories, it appears that Divine 
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Utilitarianism provides more of a holistic justification for his worldview, in that it explains how 
multiple facets and doctrines of theism are to be understood in light of the nature of God, as a 
utilitarian being. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 Divine Utilitarianism can only be properly understood if one has a proper understanding 
of what is meant by the divine and by utilitarianism. So in order to appropriately articulate the 
theory of Divine Utilitarianism definitions of God and of utility were promoted. For a proper 
understanding of God and His nature the works of Anselm and Thomas Aquinas were examined. 
Anselm submitted that God is the being that-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought,99 and 
Thomas believed God to be the greatest possible being, having no potentiality and being pure 
actuality.100 With this framework concerning God and His nature set, focus transitioned to 
understanding what is meant by “utility”. In this endeavor Augustine’s belief that there are 
degrees of goodness was addressed first, then the ethical philosophies of Bentham and Mill were 
discussed. It was in this section that it was discerned, if Augustine is correct in regards to degrees 
of goodness, then God is the greatest good, the Good. In conjunction with this belief, Bentham 
and Mill’s utilitarian principle of doing the greatest good for the greatest number was addressed. 
This foundation of terms then allowed for the theory of Divine Utilitarianism to be articulated. 
 William Paley commits entire sections of his Moral and Political Philosophy to 
expressing the idea that God is a utilitarian. He does this by appealing to his revered teleological 
argument and taking it a step further into the ethical branch of philosophy. John Gay and 
William Paley both contended that God not only created the world such that it is hospitable for 
human life but that it is designed for the flourishing of human life. They go further by saying that 
God wished and willed the happiness of human beings when He created them.101 This concept of 
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Divine Utilitarianism brought about a new argument in support of the theory which is 
significantly different but arrives at the same conclusion of God as a utilitarian ethicist. This new 
Divine Utilitarianism argued that, P1) Relationship with God is the greatest good/happiness a 
human being can experience. P2) God desires as many human beings to have relationship with 
Him as possible. P3) Utilitarians desire the greatest good/happiness for as many human beings as 
possible. C) Therefore God is a utilitarian because He desires the greatest good for as many 
human beings as possible. This argument utilizes the aforementioned definitions of God and 
utility in order to establish that if these definitions are in fact the case, then God is a utilitarian. 
 The distinction was drawn however that Divine Utilitarianism is not the only ethical 
theory that people attempt to claim as descriptive of and applicable to God. The rival theory to 
Divine Utilitarianism is Divine Command Theory. Divine Command Theory is the popular 
stance regarding the ethics of God, and it explains that God is the moral law giver, thus whatever 
commands or declarations He makes concerning morality and what is right to do or wrong to do, 
is in fact the case due to His moral authority.102 This effort to understand morality and the ethics 
of God effectively educates regarding what God does in relation to morality and what actions are 
good and for what reasons are they good. However, this is not seen as satisfactory for the 
adherent of Divine Utilitarianism. 
 A juxtaposition concerned with addressing the explanatory power of these opposing 
theories shows that Divine Utilitarianism explicates more about God’s nature and ethics than 
Divine Command Theory is capable of. Whereas the latter of these efforts gives understanding of 
what God does and what actions are considered morally praiseworthy or reprehensible; the 
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former theory gives explanations concerning why God does what He does, how God’s necessity 
to be worshipped by free, rational, sentient beings is satisfied, and how theodicies are justified as 
a response to the problem of evil. The explanatory power of these theories is palpably contrasted 
by this juxtaposition. Divine Command Theory goes much farther into its discovery of God’s 
nature, how He relates the mankind, and how mankind relates to Him. It is this capability of 
providing a more satisfactory understanding of God, coupled with the purposive nature of the 
argument in favor of Divine Utilitarianism which reveal it to be a considerable candidate for 
understanding the ethics of God. 
 Finally, if the objective of this paper has been met, then Divine Utilitarianism has been 
shown to be a plausible if not outright veridical belief concerning the ethics of God. For, if 
relationship with God truly is the greatest good/happiness a human being can experience, God 
desires as many human beings to have relationship with Him as possible, and utilitarians desire 
the greatest good/happiness for as many human beings as possible, then God is a utilitarian 
because He desires the greatest good for as many human beings as possible. Further still, if this 
is the case, then various areas of one’s theology and philosophy will yield more clarity. These 
areas include that one will know why God acts or what ends He aims to bring about when He 
acts. One will also have a sufficient answer for how God’s necessity to be worshipped is satisfied 
since relationship with God intrinsically brings about worship of Him by rational, free, sentient 
beings. Lastly, this approach to God’s ethics brings much needed clarity and fluidity to the 
subject of theodicies. On the contrary, if one finds Divine Utilitarianism –the way that it is 
argued for in this work— to be an abhorrent doctrine, or erroneous in some capacity, or even 
entirely fallacious, then the questions that are answered by the theory must be accounted for in 
one’s subsequent and rebutting argument. However, it is contended here that God’s desire to 
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bring about the greatest happiness for as many human beings as possible through relationship 
with Him is the most satisfactory answer to these aforementioned queries. The reality that God 
intentionally acts in order to bring about the greatest good and happiness for His creatures –at 
least admittedly in the area of theodicies— is an incredibly blessed truth that ought to not only 
encourage all of mankind, but rouse a desire within human beings to know God more thoroughly 
and intimately—for their greatest happiness and for the necessary and deserved worship of God. 
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